(Illustration by Gaich Muramatsu)
I am not fully clear on the details below of the AFS changes for kerberos 5, but I thought it would be helpful for coda folks to be aware of what's going on (it was news to me). ------- Forwarded Message >From kerberos-admin_at_mit.edu Mon Aug 26 13:40:18 2002 Return-Path: <kerberos-admin_at_mit.edu> Delivered-To: gdt_at_ir.bbn.com Received: from pch.mit.edu (PCH.MIT.EDU [18.7.21.90]) by fnord.ir.bbn.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 83F4C3C36 for <gdt_at_ir.bbn.com>; Mon, 26 Aug 2002 13:40:18 -0400 (EDT) Received: from pch.mit.edu (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by pch.mit.edu (8.9.3+Sun/8.9.3) with ESMTP id NAA07907; Mon, 26 Aug 2002 13:32:48 -0400 (EDT) Received: from pacific-carrier-annex.mit.edu (PACIFIC-CARRIER-ANNEX.MIT.EDU [18.7.21.83]) by pch.mit.edu (8.9.3+Sun/8.9.3) with ESMTP id NAA07874; Mon, 26 Aug 2002 13:31:07 -0400 (EDT) Received: from industrial-algebra.mit.edu (KONISHI-POLIS.MIT.EDU [18.18.3.10]) by pacific-carrier-annex.mit.edu (8.9.2/8.9.2) with ESMTP id NAA14135; Mon, 26 Aug 2002 13:31:07 -0400 (EDT) Received: by industrial-algebra.mit.edu (Postfix, from userid 8042) id 546AF151FEF; Mon, 26 Aug 2002 13:31:05 -0400 (EDT) To: krbdev_at_mit.edu Cc: kerberos_at_mit.edu Mail-Followup-To: krbdev_at_mit.edu Subject: Is this too big of a change? Message-Id: <20020826173105.546AF151FEF_at_industrial-algebra.mit.edu> From: hartmans_at_mit.edu (Sam Hartman) Sender: kerberos-admin_at_mit.edu Errors-To: kerberos-admin_at_mit.edu X-BeenThere: kerberos_at_mit.edu X-Mailman-Version: 2.0 Precedence: bulk List-Help: <mailto:kerberos-request_at_mit.edu?subject=help> List-Post: <mailto:kerberos_at_mit.edu> List-Subscribe: <http://mailman.mit.edu/mailman/listinfo/kerberos>, <mailto:kerberos-request_at_mit.edu?subject=subscribe> List-Id: The Kerberos Authentication System Mailing List <kerberos.mit.edu> List-Unsubscribe: <http://mailman.mit.edu/mailman/listinfo/kerberos>, <mailto:kerberos-request_at_mit.edu?subject=unsubscribe> List-Archive: <http://mailman.mit.edu/pipermail/kerberos/> Date: Mon, 26 Aug 2002 13:31:05 -0400 (EDT) Hi. We're working on 1.2.6beta2 and are proposing to make a change that has somewhat more impact than we would normally make in a point release and we'd like to see how much trouble it would create for users. The OpenAFS and Arla community is working on support for somewhat more native krb5 authentication to AFS. Servers will support the encrypted part of a krb5 ticket sent with a special kvno as an AFS token. It turns out that if you have a special krb524d this improvement allows you to upgrade to doing krb5 AFS without any client changes. We're going to roll support for this change into the 1.2.6 krb524d. The question is: how should we determine if we use the new style tickets or whether we just issue krb44 tickets as before. The AFS community seems ready to push fairly hard for upgrades to this new technology and (when it is ready later, RXGSS) so we'd like to help them by making the default for afs principals be the new format--optimizing for future convenience at the expense of transition-time inconvenience. We plan to default to the new format afs principals with an exception list of afs principals that should receive normal krb4 tickets. This means that if you were to deploy 1.2.6 today, you'd have to create an exception list for any afs cells your KDC serves. Does anyone believe this is too much work for sites to do when deploying 1.2.6? I'm much more interested in reports that this actually would be a problem than reports of how this might be a problem for a hypothetical third party or how I could do something different. Thanks, - --Sam ________________________________________________ Kerberos mailing list Kerberos_at_mit.edu http://mailman.mit.edu/mailman/listinfo/kerberos ------- End of Forwarded MessageReceived on 2002-08-27 11:33:48